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Foreword 
This paper is a result of a 6 month research project financed by the Nordic Council for Alcohol 
and Drug Research (Nordiska Nämden för Alkohol- och Drogforskning – NAD) under the 
Nordic Council of Ministers. NAD operates to promote interdisciplinary cooperation in alcohol 
and drug research as well as in research concerned with other addictive substances, and aims to 
increase knowledge and understanding about substance abuse, prevention, policy issues, 
substance-related harm, and the treatment of substance abusers. 
The general aim of the project “Globalization and Nordic Alcohol Policy” was to address 
questions related to changes in the Nordic alcohol policy and the impact of globalization. The 
project was to explore how national institutions relate to international organisations with a 
potential influence on alcohol policy. The World Trade Organization (WTO) was seen as 
especially relevant here. Researcher Svanaug Fjær was assigned as leader of the project, Lise 
Hellebø was assigned as researcher and carried out the study. 
 
 
Bergen, 26 March 2003     
 
Svanaug Fjær 
Project director    
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Forord 
Dette notatet er et resultat av et 6 måneders prosjekt finansiert av Nordiska Nämden för 
Alkohol- och Drogforskning (NAD) under Nordisk Ministerråd. NAD har som oppgave å 
fremme og utvikle tverrvitenskapelig samarbeide innenfor alkohol- og rusmiddelforskning, og 
arbeider for å fordype kunnskap om konsum, forebygging, rusmiddelpolitikk, rusrelaterte skader 
og behandling av rusmiddelmisbrukere. 
Den generelle målsettingen for prosjektet “Globalisering og nordisk alkoholpolitikk” var å ta 
opp spørsmål som gjelder endringer i alkoholpolitikken i Norden og den økende globaliseringens 
betydning for disse endringene. Prosjektet skulle undersøke hvordan nasjonale institusjoner 
forholder seg til internasjonale organisasjoner med betydning for alkoholpolitikken, og Verdens 
Handelsorganisasjon (WTO) ble sett på som en særlig interessant aktør i denne sammenhengen. 
Forsker Svanaug Fjær har vært prosjektleder og Lise Hellebø var tilsatt som forsker i prosjektet.  
 
 
Bergen, 26. mars 2003     
 
Svanaug Fjær 
Prosjektleder 
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Summary 
Several recent studies argue that the Nordic alcohol policy, based on restrictive measures and 
aimed at reducing consumption, is changing. This paper discusses the potential impact of 
globalization on Nordic Alcohol policy – exemplified by the liberalising efforts of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). Two countries; Norway and Sweden, are in focus. Three types of 
integration; positive integration, negative integration and “framing” integration, are introduced in 
order to characterize the influence of the WTO. Relevant WTO agreements and national 
participation patterns in the WTO organisation are accounted for. A conclusion is that the WTO 
has indeed influenced and to some extent changed alcohol regulation in many countries. This is 
mainly a result of efforts to reduce trade barriers. Public health motivated arguments have so far 
not had any weighty importance in the WTO. The influence of the WTO can mainly be assessed 
as negative integration through liberalization efforts, and as “framing” integration as influence on 
norms and cognition of involved actors. The more direct and prescriptive pressure from positive 
integration is less evident. Established national institutions and traditions can to some extent 
resist and modify externally initialised reforms. At the same time, the Nordic countries are highly 
globalised, and the further globalization pressure is powerful. Increasing liberalization efforts 
from the WTO must be followed with vigilance from actors in the national and Nordic alcohol 
policy field, if the traditional Nordic Alcohol policy is to remain standing. 
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Sammendrag 
Nordisk alkoholpolitikk, tradisjonelt basert på en restriktiv linje og med en målsetting om å 
redusere det totale alkoholinntaket, er i endring. Dette slås fast i flere studier som nylig er utgitt. 
Dette notatet diskuterer globaliseringens innflytelse i den endrete nordiske alkoholpolitikken, 
eksemplifisert ved den liberaliseringen som skjer gjennom Verdens Handelsorganisasjons (WTO) 
innflytelse. To land, Norge og Sverige, vies særlig oppmerksomhet. WTOs potensielle 
innflytelsen karakteriseres ved hjelp av tre integrasjonstyper – positiv integrasjon, negativ 
integrasjon og “framing” integrasjon. Relevante WTO-avtaler og nasjonal deltakelse i WTOs 
organisasjon gjennomgåes. En konklusjon er at WTO har påvirket og til en viss grad endret 
alkoholreguleringen i flere land. Dette er hovedsakelig et resultat av WTOs arbeid for å redusere 
handelshindringer mellom land. Helserelaterte argumenter har så langt ikke hatt noen særlig 
gjennomslagskraft innenfor WTO-samarbeidet. Innflytelsen fra WTO kan hovedsakelig forstås 
som negativ integrasjon gjennom liberalisering, og som “framing” integrasjon gjennom 
påvirkning av nasjonale aktørers normer og oppfatninger. Den mer direkte innflytelsen i form av 
positiv integrasjon er ikke like tydelig. Etablerte nasjonale institusjoner og tradisjoner kan i stor 
grad motstå og modifisere reformforsøk utenfra. Samtidig kan nordiske land karakteriseres som 
sterkt globaliserte, og sannsynligheten for endringer på grunn av en økende globalisering er stor. 
Om det er et mål at den tradisjonelle nordiske alkoholpolitikken skal bestå, bør derfor et økende 
liberaliseringspress fra WTO følges med årvåkenhet fra aktørene innenfor nordisk alkohol-
politikk.
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Nordic Alcohol Policy and 
Globalization as a Changing 
Force 
Alcohol policy in the Nordic countries is often presented as unique, because of the 
strong emphasis on social control and overall health protection and prevention, and the 
exceptional role of the state in the regulation of alcohol consumption. Indeed, many 
other countries do not have a pronounced official alcohol policy. In most EU countries 
questions related to alcohol trade and consumption falls within the sphere of agricultural 
or industrial policy, and alcohol is seen purely as a commercial product (Holder et al. 
1998:25). Although restrictive measures may be in force, such as regulated opening 
hours for retailers and restaurants, they are often not explicitly motivated by efforts to 
reduce alcohol consumption. More often such regulations are justified by consideration 
of local commerce or workers’ welfare. In the Nordic countries, alcohol policy is 
strongly tied to public health and social policy, significantly more so than in most other 
countries of the world. 
Alcohol policy in the Nordic countries is in general aimed at reducing the 
consumption of alcohol and the acute and long-term adverse effects of alcohol 
consumption (see for instance Edwards et al. 1996:7). A traditional view is that Nordic 
alcohol policy is primarily alcohol control policy. Alcohol control policy involves 
regulation of the alcohol market in order to control and limit consumption and thus 
reduce harmful effects. However, alcohol policy can also be viewed more widely. This 
would include both direct control of negative effects, and more indirect measures; 
involving policy choices and actions that (also unintentionally) can influence attitudes, 
consumption and alcohol trade. Alcohol policy also has commercial aspects, involving 
trade, export and import of alcoholic beverages. 
This paper discusses the potential influence of globalization on Nordic alcohol 
policy. In order to focus the study empirically, the potential impact of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) on national alcohol regulation and policy is given particular 
attention. The main aim is to understand how globalization and the globalization debate 
can inform and influence the Nordic alcohol policy field. In order to get an introductory 
overview of the field, the first part of the paper addresses recent changes in the Nordic 
alcohol policy field, and looks into contemporary research and policy documents 
published in Norway and Sweden. This section asks the question: How has the 
international level entered the traditional national field of alcohol policy?  
When globalization is discussed, a clarification of what is meant by the term is 
pertinent. The second part of the paper therefore addresses contemporary globalization 
literature and the extensive theoretical debate on globalization and globalization 
WORKING  PAPER 5  – 2003 NO R D I C  ALCOHOL POLICY  AND GLOBALIZATION 
8 
processes. The third (and main) part of the paper has a more empirical outlook, 
focussing in particular on the WTO and its potential influence on national alcohol 
policy.  
Throughout the paper, three analytical concepts focussing integration are central. 
Globalization can be seen as a form of “world” integration. Globalization implies that 
relations and interaction across borders become more tightly interwoven and can 
transform domestic relations, dominant beliefs, attitudes and policy decisions. 
Borrowing a set of analytical terms from Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999), three ideal types 
describing different types of integration are used to understand this process: positive 
integration, negative integration and “framing” integration. Knill and Lehmkuhl are mainly 
concerned with the Europeanization of domestic institutions. This paper will use their 
approach to focus the possible impact of globalization on domestic institutions. 
N e g a t i v e ,  P o s i t i v e  a n d  F r a m i n g  I n t e g r a t i o n  
In the terminology of Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999), negative integration involves a 
deregulative element. By intervening against national barriers to the free movement of 
goods, persons, capital and services, negative integration reduces the range of national 
policy choices and represents a loss of political control and national regulatory power. 
In the context of the EU, negative integration demands that domestic regulation 
complies with Community law. Thus, negative integration implies indirect institutional 
impact. It does not so much specify how national governments should run their 
country, but rather tells them what they cannot do. This is therefore a more indirect 
integrative instrument. Regulation aimed at eliminating barriers of trade is typical 
instruments of negative integration. In contrast to negative integration, positive integration 
re-regulation rather than deregulation. Positive integration intervenes directly into 
national regulation by prescribing or at least encouraging new institutional models at the 
domestic level to regulate certain areas. By prescribing a concrete institutional model, a 
comparatively low level of room for adaptation is left open to the country in question. 
The third ideal type established by Knill and Lehmkul, framing integration, takes on a 
more indirect form and includes a cognitive element. It describes efforts to set norms in 
areas where underlying conflicts of interest more often result in symbolic or vague 
policy commitments rather than in demands for regulative compliance. Framing 
domestic beliefs and expectations can become manifest in transformed beliefs of 
domestic actors or in reconfigured domestic discourses. The idea is that transformed 
values and participation patterns will add to domestic reforms or initialise reform steps, 
and thus provide legitimisation for the implementation of national reform policies. 
Framing integration can also be understood as cognitive integration, as it is based on a 
cognitive logic and designed to change the political climate.  
Framing integration denotes a more indirect form of integration compared to 
negative or positive integration, and it can provide additional legitimacy for domestic 
leaders to justify the content and implementation of national reform policies. It provides 
adequate concepts of reform to resolve specific problems and thus an acceptable 
solution based on national conditions, and alters the expectations of reform opponents 
and their strategies (Knill and Lehmkul 1999). Through these mechanisms, domestic 
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reform is facilitated. Framing integration is thus an instrument that allows for national 
diversity while at the same time accommodating integration. It can eventually result in 
more direct regulation, through either negative or positive integration. In many cases, 
one of the integration forms may dominate. However, most policy fields are probably 
characterized by a mixture of the three. 
Typical measures of framing integration include the establishment of expert networks 
or research or documentation institutions. In the European drugs policy area, the 
establishment of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction 
(EMCDDA) is illustrative (Fjær 2000). Framing integration can also be furthered 
through general legislation. General legislation can alter expectations and beliefs of 
domestic actors, and in so doing trigger domestic change. This is characteristic of some 
of the more overriding European regulation, regulation that does not prescribe specific 
legislative regimes or institutional models, and allow for national variations.  
The ideal types are helpful for understanding mechanisms of integration. They are in 
the following used to analyse how globalization can influence domestic institutions and 
alcohol policy in the Nordic countries, and more specificly on how the World Trade 
Organisation can influence Nordic alcohol policy. 
E m p i r i c a l  C a s e s  a n d  M e t h o d  
Norway and Sweden constitute the empirical cases of the paper. The two countries are 
selected mainly in order to limit data collection and the extent of the study. 
Furthermore, the two countries enjoy important similarities in terms of alcohol policy, 
and can be seen as the main bearers of the Nordic approach to alcohol policy. At the 
same time, the different international relations of the two countries might create 
differences in policy towards international organisations. Both countries are among the 
early signatories of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the 
predecessor of the WTO. Norway signed in 1948, Sweden in 1950. Sweden is a member 
of the EU since 1995, while Norway participates in the European Economic Area 
(EEA). This implies that the relations and practices towards the WTO differ. 
The study is based on qualitative data. In order to assess main trends of Nordic 
alcohol policy, official documents and secondary literature has been examined. 
Secondary literature has also been central in the review of the contemporary 
globalization debate. A further examination of official papers and documents has been 
important when looking at the WTO. In addition, three interviews with officials in 
Norway and Sweden have informed the analysis.1  
                                                 
1 One interview with a senior officer in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,  the WTO section, was carried out 
in June 2002 (Interview 1). Two interviews were carried out in Sweden in September 2002; one with a Secretary of 
Ministry (Departementssekretær) in the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interview 2), and one with a senior 
officer in the Swedish Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, responsible for international alcohol questions 
(Interview 3). 
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The Nordic Alcohol Pol icy in Transit ion  
There exist many accounts of the development and characteristics of Nordic alcohol 
policy. Holder et al. (1998), Sulkunen et al. (2000), Tigerstedt (2001a) and Ugland (2002) 
have published major works discussing the history and development of the Nordic 
alcohol policy approach. Recent research and literature emphasize changes in the 
Nordic alcohol policy field. The influence of the European Union and Europeanization 
processes feature as important explanatories for recent changes in the Nordic alcohol 
policy field. Only a few studies look towards organisations with wider remit. These 
studies bring in a global perspective when analysing trends in the alcohol policy field 
(for instance Grieshaber-Otto and Jernigan 2001, Grieshaber-Otto and Schacter 2001, 
Alavaikko 2002 and Gould and Schacter 2002).  
This part of the paper will look into contemporary literature and policy papers in 
order to assess how the changes in the Nordic alcohol policy are interpreted. A central 
question is: What role does globalization play as explanatory in the changed alcohol 
policy field in the Nordic countries? 
The Nordic alcohol policy is emphasised as peculiar compared to the rest of Europe 
and the world at large, both in literature and in recent policy documents. First of all, the 
Nordic countries have a long history of state control and state monopolies over much 
of alcohol production. In Norway, Sweden and Finland state monopolies have 
controlled both wholesale, import, and export; as well as alcohol retail sales in bars and 
restaurants (on-premise) and at stores for drinking elsewhere (off-premises) (Holder et 
al. 1998:1). Holder et al. (Ibid.) point out that the purpose of the alcohol control policy 
in the Nordic countries was and still is  
…to maintain a lower overall consumption of alcoholic beverages and lower levels of associated 
alcohol-related problems by reducing private profits and promotion of all aspects of alcohol, 
restricting retail access to alcohol, limiting personal imports of lower-cost alcohol from other 
countries, and maintaining high retail prices.  
Ugland (2002) notes that the distinctive Nordic alcohol policy is based in specific social 
characteristics, cultural traditions and historical experiences of the Nordic countries, 
rooted in the nation building and welfare state projects, and associated with strong 
social forces (the labour movement, Low Church groups and an independent 
temperance movement) (Ugland 2002:52).  
Several authors point to important changes in the Nordic alcohol policy in the recent 
years (see Holder et al. 1998, Sulkunen 2000, Tigerstedt 2001a and Ugland 2002). 
Tigerstedt argues that the field is dissolving. Ugland describes the recent changes as a 
combination of “policy recategorization and integration”. Both emphasize the influence 
of the EU and the Europeanization process. Although important changes are 
recognized, there are discussions on how far the changes in alcohol policy have gone in 
the individual Nordic countries, and there are disagreements on how to characterize the 
changes (see Romanus 2001, Hauge 2001, Fjær 2001 and Tigerstedt 2001b).  
Recently published policy documents recognises the changes and trends that are 
pointed out in the research litera ture. There seems to be a general agreement that the 
changes have been institutional and formal, as well as more general and cognitive (a 
change of ideas and beliefs). At the same time, these policy documents seem to stress 
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continuity in policy goals (see for instance Swedish Ministry of Health and Social Affairs 
2001 and Norwegian Ministry of Social Affairs 2002). An important question is, how are 
the changes interpreted? 
The Swedish government points to new and changing international conditions when 
describing their approach to alcohol policy. A report on the Swedish alcohol policy plan 
2001-2005 admits that “Increased international exchange and Sweden’s EU membership 
partially modified the basis of this country’s traditional efforts to prevent alcohol-related 
harm” (Swedish Ministry of Health and Social Affairs 2001:6). Increased movement of 
people and goods across borders, and the increased contact which follows and 
influences attitudes towards alcohol and other matters. Thus, internal changes have 
followed from external pressure. According to the report, the state has taken on a new 
and different role. Decisions are now concentrated on individuals and local community 
rather than on the population or country as a whole. Changed conditions on the 
international and on the national level lead to the assumption that the traditional tools 
used to reduce alcohol consumption do not work as effectively as they used to. The 
traditional tools will “…remain significant in the future, but they must be supplemented 
by further measures to prevent any renewed rise in the trend of alcohol-related harm” 
(Ibid:7). International influence thus figures as a major explanatory for changed alcohol 
policy in Sweden.  
International influence has also been recognised in Norway. The Norwegian action 
plan on alcohol and drugs 2003-2005 recognises that “Increased internationalisation 
(economical, political and cultural) and other societal changes in recent years have led to 
policy adjustments” (Norwegian Ministry of Social Affairs 2002:11, my translation). The 
impact of increased international influence was also stated as the main reason behind 
the government NOU-report in 1995 (NOU 1995). This report must be seen on the 
background of the establishment of the European Economic Area (EEA) and the 
Norwegian negative vote in the referendum on EU membership in 1994. It states that 
“The development towards an increasingly tighter international contact creates new 
challenges for Norway. This is also true within the alcohol policy field. When the world 
changes, it becomes necessary to consider whether the means of our alcohol policy are 
efficient enough in order to meet the challenges ahead of us, and whether it could be 
necessary to put new measures into use” (NOU 1995:24, my translation). Despite the 
recognition of a changing environment, the conclusions of the report on strategies for 
the future were “more of the same” rather than proposals for major change. 
A comparison of the policy documents in question reveals that Sweden seems to 
have a more proactive approach to the international level of alcohol policy. The Swedish 
report on the future alcohol policy emphasises the importance of international 
collaboration and a strengthening of public health issues in international relations – 
especially within the EU (Swedish Ministry of Health and Social Affairs 2001:13). An 
argument to support this is that Sweden was responsible for a WHO European 
Ministerial Conference on Young People and Alcohol in February 2001, and also took 
initiative for the EU Commission to embark on drafting voluntary codes of conduct for 
businesses that produce and retail alcohol, covering sale and marketing aimed at 
children or young people. Following this, a “Recommendation on Drinking of Alcohol 
by Young People, especially Children and Adolescents” was approved by the 
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Commission in 2001 (COM 2000/736). During the Swedish Presidency of the EU 
Council, Sweden proposed Council Conclusions on the need for an alcohol strategy. 
Here, the Commission was urged to start working on a strategy to reduce harmful 
effects of alcohol. Sweden is a member of the EU and Norway is not. This can give 
Sweden both incentive and opportunity to influence other EU members to adopt their 
ideas and attitudes towards alcohol. Because Norway is not an EU member, the 
opportunity for influence can be seen as more remote. 
Even though the influence of “foreign” ideas and behaviour, and in particular the 
influence from Europeanization and international or global processes are recognised in 
both Sweden and Norway, this is not seen exclusively as a one-way relationship. The 
Swedish report on contemporary alcohol policy recognises that other countries might 
well be influenced by attitudes in the Nordic countries towards alcohol as well.2 A 
Nordic seminar on alcohol policy and globalization held in Åbo, Finland in 2001, 
emphasised the multifaceted character of globalization processes (Finnish Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Health 2002). Here, an approximation of consumption trends in 
alcohol was highlighted. A trend from national to global markets was recognised in 
addition to the changes in domestic drinking patterns. Also, alterations on the 
international policy level were recognised: towards common approaches to alcohol 
policy at EU level (Renström 2002:99). A conclusion made by Renström was that 
decision-making within the alcohol policy field is becoming both more local and more 
international at the same time, as a result of a gradual reduction of national measures. 
Allegedly, even countries that are not members of the EU use EU regulation as an 
argument for imposing less restrictive national regulation. 
The literature and the policy documents I have looked at here emphasise a mixture 
of negative, positive and framing integration. This means that the changes that are 
taking place, are seen to follow from both liberalization efforts (negative integration), 
direct legislation (positive integration) and cognitive processes, i. e. the influence of 
beliefs and expectations (framing integration). The explanatory weight of the three 
integration forms varies in different papers. The policy documents in particular illustrate 
the “framing” effect; although the continuation of traditional policy goals and measures 
are emphasised, the change in beliefs and expectation (typical of framing integration) are 
rendered significant. 
While none of the major academic studies or the policy initiatives and documents on 
Nordic alcohol policy explicitly discusses globalization as a changing force, many of the 
changes in policy are related to broader globalization forces and international trends. In 
the literature, Europeanization and the influence of European integration dominate as 
explanatory. In the policy documents, the reference is mainly to “international 
influence”. There are few attempts to go deeper into an analysis of what the 
international (or global) influence is, and how it should be interpreted. The next section 
                                                 
2 Wine consumption in Southern and Central European countries has decreased considerable over the last decades, 
while consumption patterns especially among young people resemble the traditional consumption pattern in the 
Nordic countries, where intoxication and consumption of beer and spirits is more common (Ministry of Health 
and Social Affairs Sweden 2002:6-7). This argument was also emphasised in an interview with an informant in the 
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs in Stockholm, September 2002. 
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of the paper will attempt to fill this void, by focussing recent globalization debate and 
literature.  
What is  Global izat ion?  
Globalization has become the buzz-word of our time, but in many cases it is not clear 
what globalization means. Many fail to define what lies in the phrase, and this could lead 
to globalization becoming an “empty” expression. Globalization is often seen as 
influencing “all” aspects of society, and might therefore have a large potential for 
changing normative understandings and interpretations, as well as formal arrangements 
and institutions. This might lead to changes in power distribution between central 
actors, and thereby change relations between important actors in different policy fields. 
The influence on public policy, herein approaches to alcohol control, are adjacent.  
The impact of globalization in a particular policy area cannot be discussed without 
examining further what characterises globalization. If we are to assess whether 
globalization is of relevance for the alcohol policy field at all, we need at least to 
understand the theoretical basis of what globalization is.  
The precise content and meaning of globalization is highly debated. A useful starting 
point is the book Globalization: a critical introduction by Scholte (2000). He distinguishes 
between five different definitions of globalization that figure in contemporary literature. 
These emphasise respectively internationalisation, liberalization, universalization, 
westernisation (or modernisation) and deterritorialization (or a spread of supraterri-
toriality). Scholte thus demonstrates that the term globalization is used in different ways, 
and covers a great many dimensions. If this is not recognized, it can result in a 
confusing picture and analysis of what globalization is. Scholte builds his own approach 
on a definition of deterritorialization, emphasising that globalization “...entails a recon-
figuration of geography, so that social space is no longer wholly mapped in terms of 
territorial places, territorial distances and territorial borders” (Ibid:16).  
David Held et al. (1999) have published a major work on contemporary globalization 
with the extensive book titled Global Transformations. Politics, Economics and Culture. Held et 
al. define globalization much in the same way as Scholte, emphasising transformations 
of spatial-temporal dimensions. An understanding of globalization must, according to 
them, acknowledge the distinctive spatial attributes of globalization processes and the 
way these unfold over time. Globalization implies a stretching of social, political and 
economic activities across frontiers, and patterns of interaction which transcend 
constituent societies and states are intensified. This growing extensity and intensity of 
global interconnectedness can imply a speeding up (higher velocity) of global 
interactions (Ibid:15). Globalization is thus defined as (Ibid:16) 
…a process (or sets of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organisation of 
social relations or transactions – assessed in the terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and 
impact – generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, 
and the exercise of power.  
This definition includes both quantitative and qualitative aspects, and also helps 
distinguish globalization from more restricted processes of internationalisation.  
WORKING  PAPER 5  – 2003 NO R D I C  ALCOHOL POLICY  AND GLOBALIZATION 
14 
The definition of globalization that is used in Held et al. implies that globalization can 
influence all sectors and all areas of social life. However, the impact of globalization 
varies across countries and across different sectors, and can follow different paths and 
paces. In their work on the different integration forms (negative, positive and framing 
integration), Knill and Lehmkul (1999) make use of a distinction between institutional 
“fit” and institutional “misfit” that can be of relevance here. Their argument is that 
different policy approaches, based in negative, positive or framing integration, are 
successful depending on the institutional compatibility of the country in question. The 
notion of institutional compatibility implies that the degree of national institutional fit or 
misfit may facilitate or hinder policy changes and reform originating from the European, 
international or global level. Domestic resistance to change is most likely in cases where 
reform efforts imply fundamental change of well-established regulatory patterns or 
institutional arrangements (Knill and Lehmkul 1999:5). Domestic reform is a more likely 
scenario if new policies require only moderate and incremental adjustments. In this 
discussion, the institutionalised Nordic alcohol policy field, with its long history, strong 
traditions and unique character might represent a case of “high institutional misfit” in 
the face of the liberalization pressures from outside, and domestic resistance towards 
changes can be assumed considerable. 
At the same time, in a global context, Nordic countries can be seen as highly 
globalized and therefore more receptive of globalization trends compared to less 
globalized countries. A. T. Kearny and Foreign Policy Magazine have suggested a 
globalization index which is much referred to (Foreign Policy 2001). It measures levels 
of interdependence to determine how globalized different countries are. The index 
includes variables that measure the level of personal contact across borders as well as 
economic and technological integration.3 According to the index, the Nordic countries 
are highly globalized countries – among the “top twenty”. The likelihood of further 
reform, or further globalization, of already highly globalized countries is considerable. 
Nordic countries are therefore more likely to adapt compared to countries that are 
ranked lower on the globalization index. However, the Kearney/Foreign Policy Index is 
not unproblematic – as are most indexes based on a limited number of variables. 
Lockwood (2001) points out problems of measurement and weighting of the variables 
included in the index. The range of indicators and their comparability across countries 
can also be questioned. Globalization is a complex matter, and many aspects of global 
integration defy measurement. One example is the globalization of culture and cultural 
exchange. 
Some globalization papers focus on how national structures and traditions modify 
globalization developments. Rieger and Leibfried (1998) argue that national structures of 
welfare and social policy and their developments can trigger, contain, differentiate or 
                                                 
3 The index quantifies economic integration by combining data on trade, foreign direct investment, capital flows and 
income payments and receipts. It charts personal contact via levels of international travel and tourism, international 
telephone traffic and transborder transfers. The index gauges technological connectedness by counting Internet 
users and the Internet hosts and secure servers through which they communicate and conduct business 
transactions. It also assesses political engagement by taking stock of participation in international organisations and 
U.N. Security Council missions (How the Index is Calculated, available at: 
www.foreignpolicy.com/issue_janfeb_2002/methodology.html ). 
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modify, weaken or strengthen, slow down or speed up globalization. The Nordic 
alcohol policy can be considered a welfare policy that holds potential for modifying 
globalization. The modifying strength of such national arrangements is not unlimited. 
Evidence to support this can be found in the changing Nordic alcohol policy as shown 
earlier.  
Authors like Knill and Lehmkul (1999) and Rieger and Leibfried (1998) demonstrate 
that different institutional and political settings embody different potentials for 
adaptability. Thus, capacity for reform and adaptation varies across countries. This 
supports a thesis – even though measurement can be difficult – that a high level of 
integration or globalization lowers the threshold for successful reform. At the same 
time, strongly developed welfare structures and institutions as well as strong national 
policy traditions limit the impact of reform and external pressures. This dynamic might 
be helpful in explaining the current changes in the Nordic alcohol policy field. 
Even though globalization and globalization processes are discussed thoroughly in 
contemporary globalization literature, discussions on the substantial impact on particular 
national policy areas often come second to the more general and normative debates of 
what globalization is, how it should be interpreted and what it leads to. But what are the 
consequences for national policy, such as the Nordic alcohol policy? Questions like this 
one should be examined further. A thesis held by many is that globalization processes 
erode state powers, while international or supranational institutions become more 
important. If this is true, globalization should lead to a diminishing of state control and 
regulation of the alcohol market. However, predicting the outcome of globalization is an 
extremely difficult project, whereas globalization itself is a complex matter. At a 
minimum, we can agree that globalization represents a significant challenge to the 
sovereignty and authority of national states. With increasing globalization, nation states 
gradually become more enmeshed in and a part of a larger pattern of global 
transformations and global flows (Held et al. 1999:49).  
A stretching of political relations across space and time and an extension of political 
power and political activity across the boundaries of the modern nation-state describes 
the increasing globalization of politics, or development of “global politics”. And as Held 
et al. point out; the idea of global politics challenges traditional distinctions between 
domestic and international, inside/outside and territorial/non-territorial politics 
(Ibid.:50). Although governments and states remain powerful actors, they increasingly 
share the global arena with other organisations – whether they are international or 
supranational, intergovernmental or non-state. This represents a challenge for all 
traditional national policies, and in particular the Nordic alcohol policy with its distinct 
character and state foundations. At the same time, state and national policies and 
institutions are not just passive receivers of global policy and pressure. Rather, global 
ideas are filtered down and modified according to national traditions and institutional 
settings. 
We have seen that Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999) focus on different mechanisms of 
integration. Though their main interest is explaining mechanisms of Europeanization, 
their interpretation can also be used when discussing globalization. Positive integration 
– the most direct integration mechanism –  happens when domestic arrangements 
change according to prescribed institutional models. This occurs when international or 
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supranational institutions actively intervene in domestic regulation and prescribe 
regulatory instruments or new institutional models for national governments. Negative 
integration is a more indirect mechanism, but still involves compliance to international 
regulation. Regulation aimed at eliminating trade barriers is a typical instrument of 
negative integration. It does not specificly prescribe institutional models, but 
nevertheless puts limitations on domestic policy action. The liberal trade regime 
introduced by the WTO is an example of such a global institution. Framing integration 
is an even more indirect mechanism. It describes cases where ideas and understandings 
within specific policy fields are “imported” from the international or global level to the 
domestic level. Thus, this mode of integration includes a cognitive element.  Fjær (2000) 
has argued that Europeanization of the drug policy field serves as a relevant illustration 
of the more indirect form of framing integration. This type of integration can – along 
with the other two types, be important when understanding the characteristics of 
changes in the Nordic alcohol policy and globalization. 
A tentative conclusion that can be made after examining relevant globalization 
literature, is that globalization indeed has relevance and can influence changes at the 
national level. It follows that it also can have impact on the Nordic alcohol policy field. 
This urges for a more empirical outlook. The next section will thus concretise the 
analysis further by relating the three integration mechanisms developed by Knill and 
Lehmkul to the potential impact of the WTO, in context of the changing alcohol policy 
field as described in the earlier sections of this paper.  
The WTO and its Influence on Alcohol 
Pol icy  
One way to focus the possible impact of globalization on national policies, is to look at 
the influence of particular international organisations and institutions. Here, a 
concentration on the WTO is chosen partly because it is a large and significant 
international organisation that regulates trade between most of the countries of the 
world, and therefore has potential impact on questions related to alcohol trade and 
policy. The WTO is a major global actor, and its impact on national government action 
can illustrate the influence of “global” institutions on national policy. Globalization has 
largely been associated to a growth and spread of international trade, and to the 
establishment of international trade regimes and organisations, such as the WTO. The 
WTO, with 144 member states across the world, may be the most significant 
international trade organisation today. Its potential impact on trade patterns and on 
national regulation is therefore significant. 
The influence of the WTO on national alcohol policy is so far relatively unexplored. 
A starting point is that, although the WTO primarily is a trade organisation, the 
premises which it lays down for members as well as non-members are wide-reaching. 
The framework that the WTO provides may therefore have important influence on 
health related matters and alcohol policy and regulation, even though public health (and 
certainly preventive alcohol policy) is not of its core engagements. A fundamental 
discrepancy between trade liberalization and national efforts to control and minimize 
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consumption of a certain product, such as alcohol, can be identified. Therefore, it is 
particularly interesting to look into the policy field of alcohol control. 
Ugland has described the EU-Nordic relationship in the area of alcohol control 
policy as a case of substantive policy mismatch (Ugland 2002:200). Policy mismatch may 
also describe the relationship between the Nordic alcohol policy and the trade regulation 
regime of the WTO. Together with Jernigan, Grieshaber-Otto argues that there is an 
underlying incompatibility between efforts to minimize alcohol-related harm and the 
latest generation of international treaties that promote the freer flow of goods, services 
and investments (Grieshaber-Otto and Jernigan 2001). Grieshaber-Otto and Jernigan 
point out that international trade treaties are designed to foster lower prices, greater 
competition, more vigorous marketing and greater economic efficiency. This leads – 
“according to standard economic theory” – to increased production and consumption 
of the product in question. This also applies to alcohol. Furthermore, they argue that 
(Ibid.):  
The treaties are likely to be increasingly successful at boosting consumption, particularly in 
emerging markets. Under their provisions, alcohol becomes cheaper as taxes are lowered, more 
accessible as market restrictions are eliminated, and more desirable to consumers as alcohol 
products are advertised and otherwise promoted. But of course, from a societal perspective, 
increasing consumption of alcohol is likely to lead to more public health problems.  
Alavaikko (2002) has studied the possible impact of WTO on Nordic alcohol policies, 
focussing especially on Finland. He points out that WTO at ground is about trade 
policy, and therefore the social and health policy aspects of alcohol policy are the 
passive and defensive. WTO puts pressure on national liberalization and traditional 
state-centered policy systems thus become the passive part. Wider social and health 
policy reflections and alcohol-specific considerations must therefore fight for their place 
on the policy agenda (Alavaikko 2002:74). 
Regulation of alcohol is relevant in terms of the WTO, because alcohol is a 
commercial product traded among countries and therefore subject to WTO regulations. 
In addition to this, the WTO can be seen to spread ideas and beliefs based on free trade 
ideals – ideas and beliefs that can influence national actors and institutions. The 
influence of the WTO can be characterized along the lines of negative, positive and 
framing integration. This will be shown in the following sections of the paper.  
T h e  W T O  –  H i s t o r y  a n d  D e v e l o p m e n t  
In order to understand how the WTO operates, an overview of the history behind its 
establishment and the content of the agreements are important. Before the 
establishment of the predecessor to the WTO – the General Agreement of Tariffs and 
Trade in 1947 – there was no regulation of the international economy or trade. 
Individual countries and authorities were free to introduce the means and actions they 
saw fit in order to take care of their own economic interests. This freedom often 
resulted in protective measures, efforts aimed at protecting domestic production from 
foreign competition. Most countries introduced restrictive import measures and 
successive devaluations of domestic currency in the 1930’s. The result was economic 
decline and mass unemployment; in effect a worse situation for all. These negative 
WORKING  PAPER 5  – 2003 NO R D I C  ALCOHOL POLICY  AND GLOBALIZATION 
18 
experiences led to the establishment of the so called Bretton Woods negotiations, aimed 
at establishing international rules for trade and economic policy, and the following 
establishment of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. In this 
process, the first attempt to establish an International Trade Organisation (ITO) was 
initialised (Melchior and Norman 1998). However, the attempt to establish the ITO 
stranded when the American congress refused to ratify the agreement. Instead, a 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was agreed upon. This did not 
establish a trade organisation, but represented a set of rules regulating international 
trade. 23 countries signed GATT in 1947, and made way for large multilateral trade 
liberalizations. In 1995, after lengthy negotiations, the GATT was transformed in the 
WTO. With successive new signatories and extensions of scope, it now counts 144 
member countries across the world, and has undergone many changes and extensions.  
The WTO is a fully fledged trade organisation, including several trade agreements 
and a dispute settlement body for solving disagreements between member states. The 
main purpose of the multilateral trading system established by GATT and the WTO is 
to foster the flow of trade between member countries by providing a set of rules to 
regulate trade. The most important aim is to reduce trade barriers, such as customs 
duties (or tariffs), import bans or quotas that selectively restrict trade, and non-tariff 
barriers. Non-commercial values like public health appear only as exceptions to the 
agreements. The WTO agreement has three main functions: to supervise and carry out 
the international trade regulations, to operate as a forum for further negotiations, and to 
solve relevant disputes between member countries (Utenriksdepartementet 1998).  
The establishment of the WTO in 1995 meant important organisational changes 
from the previous arrangements operative through GATT. More than 50 years after the 
international trade organisation first was proposed, international trade now has a  
permanent organisation. The permanent administration of the WTO is placed in 
Geneva. The highest decision-making authority in the WTO is the Ministerial 
Conference. It is held every two years, and relevant ministers of the member states 
partake. In between the ministerial conferences the daily work of the WTO is taken care 
of by the General Council, normally ambassadors and heads of national delegations in 
Geneva, and sometimes officials sent from the member states. The General Council 
delegates supervision of different agreements to different Councils that have a more 
specialized remit; the Goods Council, the Services Council and the Intellectual Property 
(TRIPS) Council. 
With the establishment of the WTO, the scope of the trade agreement was 
significantly enlarged. While GATT mainly applied to industrial products, WTO in 
principle applies to all categories of goods, including agricultural products, textiles, trade 
in services, and to some extent capital and ideas (intellectual property or “immaterial 
rights”). With the establishment of the WTO, the interim secretariat of GATT was 
made permanent. The creation of the WTO also meant the establishment of a more 
powerful institution whereas dispute panels have the authority to make binding 
judgements in cases where trade rules are transgressed or subject to dispute (Held et al. 
1999:165). All in all, as Anderson (1998:13) argues, this meant that the overall 
supervision of international trade and dispute settlement instruments were strengthened. 
The permanent organisation has been built out considerably, but the power of initiative 
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still rests with the Member governments whose representatives constitute and preside 
over the many councils and committees within the organisation. Furthermore, the WTO 
Secretariat itself cannot challenge any member and has no right to prosecute; it is fully 
up to member states to decide whether or not to bring a dispute against another 
member to the WTO. 
The WTO builds on two important clauses or principles. The most-favoured-nation clause 
ensures that each member state is obliged to treat all other members as its “most 
favoured” trading partner. This means that every trading partner should be favoured as 
any other for both imports and exports. The principle of national treatment implies that there 
is to be no discrimination between national and foreign goods and services, and in 
relation to trade-related aspects of intellectual property. The WTO includes several 
distinct agreements signed by the member states; the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), which includes the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).4 In this paper, I will focus in 
particular two of these agreements; GATT and GATS. GATT has direct relevance for 
trade with alcohol products as it concentrates directly on trade in goods. GATS has 
relevance for trade in services, and therefore can have implications for services in the 
alcohol sector. 
T h e  I n f l u e n c e  o f  t h e  W T O  
So, what is the potential for WTO influence on national and Nordic Alcohol policy? 
First and foremost, the WTO agreements (GATT, GATS etc.) regulate actions and 
arrangements in member states by setting rules of international trade based on free trade 
and liberalization. Through this process, the WTO has a direct impact on national 
regulation and arrangements. Gould and Schacter (2002) further point out four other 
areas where alcohol control policies can be challenged by the WTO: Through 
membership qualifying processes, through periodic reviews of domestic trade policies of 
member states, through complaints from other members and dispute settlements, and 
through negotiations to expand the agreements of the WTO. The first point assesses 
that the WTO can also have significant impact on alcohol policy arrangements in non-
member countries, also in countries that are not actively seeking membership. True, the 
WTO does not have direct influence on non-members, but the indirect impact on policy 
can be profound. Let us look a bit more closely at the more indirect impact of the 
WTO. 
Because the free trade ideal has such a dominant position, and the WTO is such an 
important international organisation, thoughts and policy ideas in countries that are not 
members of the WTO are likely to be influenced. It is important for non-members to 
participate in the global trade system, in order to secure income and economic 
development. As such, the influence of the WTO can be seen as a form of framing 
                                                 
4 For a full account of the details of the different agreements, see www.wto.org  
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integration. The ideas and approaches to international trade as provided the WTO are 
therefore likely to be adopted also by countries that are not (yet) members of the 
organisation.  
Gould and Schacter (2002) argue that prospective members of the WTO tend to 
liberalize more sectors compared to member countries, in order to secure their entrance. 
Prospective members must submit progress reports on their privatisation plans to other 
member countries, and this can contribute to further liberalization pressures. The 
accession of Taiwan in 2002 might be illustrative. This story is at the same time relevant 
for the alcohol policy field.  
Before Taiwan became a member of the WTO, the state run Taiwan Tobacco and Wine 
Monopoly Bureau cornered the market for alcoholic beverages; it had monopoly control 
over domestic production of tobacco and alcohol. In 2001, the Taiwan government 
pledged to end the monopoly as part of its bid to join the WTO (Dow Jones News 
Service, 20.04.01). Thus, the alcohol monopoly was abolished before the accession to 
the WTO, because the government anticipated that the arrangement would not be 
compatible with WTO rules. With this, the production of both tobacco and alcohol 
products were opened to the private sector and government subsidies ended. Domestic 
alcohol now had to compete on an even footing with imports (Taipei Times 31.12.02 
and Taipei Journal 08.02.02). However, the dissolution of the state run monopoly 
apparently did not raise concern for excessive alcohol consumption, as we would expect 
to happen if the alcohol monopolies in the Nordic countries were abolished. On the 
contrary, there was concern about an expected increase of prices on alcohol and cigarettes 
(Taipei Times 31.12.2001) and an increase of moonshining activities (Taipei Times 
07.05.2000). This goes to show that alcohol monopolies are not always motivated by 
public health interests. The state monopoly of Taiwan was not aimed at reducing or 
controlling alcohol consumption for public health purposes. It held prices at a low level, 
controlled import, and was mainly a source of revenue for the state. Some claimed that 
the Taiwan state alcohol monopoly also was motivated by voter-seeking activity, 
because it secured low prices on alcoholic beverages for the consumer (Taipei Journal 
19.09.1999). 
Gould and Schacter (2002) show that alcohol control policies can be influenced by 
the periodic reviews that the WTO make of member states’ trade policies. Existing 
members of the WTO are reviewed at certain intervals, and have to account for their 
current trade policies. The frequency of the reviews depends on the country’s share of 
world trade. EU members are reviewed together every two years. This means that 
Sweden as an EU member is not reviewed separately, while Norway is (every four 
years). In one particular case, questions concerning alcohol policies became relevant. In 
1996 specific questions were asked about Norway’s state trading operations for alcohol. 
One of the discussants participating in the WTO review commented that “The current 
régime, covering production, foreign trade and domestic distribution of alcoholic 
beverages was still over-regulated and trade directing given the additional high taxes and 
excise duties. Progress had been made but further liberalization would be welcomed” 
(WT/TPR/M/15, 5. august 1996:9). Further information on the restrictive system for 
licencing system for imports, exports and wholesale distribution of alcoholic beverages 
was requested by the representative of Chile, and a representative of the EU requested 
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further clarification of Norway’s intentions to open competition in the area of alcoholic 
beverages. The representative of Norway responded that the retail monopoly would not 
be abolished, as it was considered an important element of Norway’s alcohol policy 
(WT/TPR/M/15, 5 August 1996:25). According to one of my informants, the WTO 
questions on the Norwegian alcohol policy referred to here have not had any significant 
impact (Interview 1). This interpretation must be seen on the background that this 
particular informant is what can be characterised as an “insider” to the WTO, working in 
the Norwegian Foreign Ministry’s WTO section. An official in the alcohol policy field (for 
instance in the Social Ministry) would probably see the case differently. As Alavaikko 
points out, Arcus AS – responsible for import and retail sale of alcoholic beverages in 
Norway – has been partly privatised since. The state now owns 34 percent, compared to 
100 percent before 1998 (St. meld. 1 (2002-2003). Alavaikko (2002) ties this to the WTO 
review of 1996, but the direct impact of the review on this matter is difficult to prove. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the alcohol policy of Norway is something that 
other WTO members take an interest in. Referring to the types of integration discussed 
earlier, the WTO questions in the review of Norway can be seen to represent a type of 
framing integration – whereas the questions that were related to alcohol control system of 
Norway reveals a sceptical attitude from some of the other member states. 
G A T T  
GATT was designed to gradually reduce tariffs and other border measures that are 
considered barriers to trade in goods. Alcohol is relevant under GATT, whereas alcohol 
in principle is a commercial product like any other. The most-favoured-nation clause 
and the principle of national treatment apply in the same way for alcohol as for any 
other goods. This means that a member country cannot treat foreign alcohol products 
differently from domestic products. However, as long as there is no discrimination, each 
member state is free to impose any domestic tax they wish. In principle therefore, 
domestic taxes imposed in order to reduce alcohol consumption can freely be 
implemented as long as it does not favour domestic products. The most-favoured-
nation-clause applies in the same way: A member state can not favour products from a 
particular country or region without giving the same treatment to all other WTO 
members. Most countries have legitimate needs for import protection in certain areas. 
Each member state has committed itself on separate national binding list, and cannot 
add other import restrictions. This list includes upper limits for tariffs for particular 
products (Utenriksdepartementet 1998). 
GATT includes a health provision which states that “…nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of 
measures (…) necessary to protect human, animal of plant life or health” (GATT 1947: 
Article XX). This article has been ascribed great importance, especially in the face of 
critics who argue negative consequences of liberalization of trade. The health provision 
has so far not been claimed in relation to trade in alcohol. However, the “Thai cigarette 
case 1990” might serve as an illustration of what could happen if the health provision was 
claimed in the case of alcohol control. In 1990, the Thai government issued an import 
ban on cigarettes for public health reasons. The legality of this according to WTO 
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regulations was soon disputed by other members. A WTO panel established to solve the 
dispute concluded that “…alternatives less restrictive than banning imported cigarettes 
were available to achieve the health objectives”, and thus dismissed the Thai 
government argument based in article XXb) that the ban was “necessary to protect 
human… life or health” (Ranson et al. 2002:20). This did not hinder a following 
implementation of strong domestic tobacco control policies by the Thai government, on 
all brands of cigarettes. The point made was that the Thai import ban discriminated 
between foreign products and domestic products. Equally, alcohol control policies do 
not interfere with WTO rules as long as they do not discriminate between foreign 
alcohol products and domestic alcohol products. 
The Thai cigarette case transported to the alcohol policy field illustrates a potential 
conflict regarding what constitutes adequate public health reasons. A crucial question in 
relation to the health provision is who decides what is an unacceptable risk, and who 
decides what is necessary to protect human life or health? According to WTO 
interpretation, if applied in a non-discriminatory way and based on scientific principles a 
regulatory action or trade barrier is justifiable. However, deciding what is an 
unacceptable risk may be difficult, and can give rise to disagreement. Disputes on the 
validity of scientific evidence, may be part of the disagreement. This was the case in the 
hormones in beef dispute between EU and the USA in 1998 (WT/DES26/15 and 
WT/DS48/13). In the Thai cigarette case, the WTO did not accept the Thai 
government arguments based on public health considerations. The borders between 
what is a public health argument and what is protecting domestic trade is nevertheless a 
difficult one – and can be contested. 
Although the health provision has not been maintained in relation to alcohol, trade in 
alcohol has been disputed in the WTO system several times: in Japan (1995), Korea 
(1998) and Chile (1999). These disputes concerned internal taxes on alcohol and alleged 
violation of article III on National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation.5 In 
short, internal taxes on domestic products differed from taxation on imported alcoholic 
beverages in all cases (Japanese “sochu”, Korean “soju” and Chilean “pisco”). In all 
three disputes, the final conclusion was that the taxation systems would have to be 
changed so as not to discriminate against foreign products (Panel report WT/DS8/R, 
WT/DS10/R, WT/DS11/R, Panel report WT/DS75/R, WT/DS84/R, and Panel 
report WT/DS87/R, WT/DS110/R). The Chilean dispute is of particular relevance 
here. It has implications for the ability for governments to discourage consumption of 
spirits with high alcohol content. Chile defended her case by arguing that the disputed 
tax measures were intended to discourage consumption of high alcohol content 
beverages, and had nothing to do with favouring domestic products. In effect, Chilean 
                                                 
5 GATT Article III 1. The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws, 
regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or 
use of products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of products in 
specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford 
protection to domestic production. 2. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the 
territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal 
charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, no 
contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or domestic products in 
a manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1. 
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pisco with a 35 percent alcohol content was taxed significantly lower than other liquor 
with 40 percent alcohol, mainly foreign produced products. The EC challenged the 
sincerity of Chile’s claim, and won the case. To conform with the ruling, Chile had to 
eliminate the differential rates of taxation. Eventually all spirits were subjected to the 
lower rate applied for pisco. Whether Chilean regulation was motivated by genuine 
public health considerations or indeed motivated by commercial interests requires a 
more detailed analysis than is possible here. The fact remains that the health argument 
did not pull through in the dispute settlement. Dispute settlements in the WTO do not 
formally have implications for future cases, but may nevertheless influence taxation 
policies in other countries. Thus, the Chilean case might well influence future disputes 
on differential taxation of alcohol products. 
A conclusion is that the WTO and GATT indeed have influenced and changed 
alcohol taxation and arrangements in several countries. This has not been directly 
related to health motivated alcohol control measures, but first and foremost been aimed 
against discrimination across borders, thus liberalization of trade. Indirectly however, 
the impact on health motivated interests can be detected, as we have seen in the Chilean 
dispute for instance. The GATT includes a health provision that allows exception for 
measures necessary to protect human (and animal or plant) life or health (Article XX 
(b)). However, according to Ranson et al. (2002:28-29), the exception under Article XX 
(b) has been interpreted narrowly in a number of cases so as to limit the extent of trade-
restrictive environmental, health and safety regulations. This might explain why this 
article has not been used in the cases concerning trade in alcohol.  
GATT does not directly prescribe certain tariff levels to which the member states 
must comply, but merely emphasises that there should be no discrimination across 
borders. The general aim is to hold tariffs at a low level, but no explicit limit is 
prescribed. In relation to the three modes of integration described by Knill and 
Lehmkuhl (1999), the instruments that the WTO make use of cannot be described as 
positive integration. Positive integration implies prescribing concrete institutional 
requirements with which member states must comply (Ibid:1). Such policies are 
explicitly directed at replacing existing domestic regulatory arrangements. Although the 
WTO agreements might change national regulation, the agreements do not positively 
prescribe domestic provisions in each member country. This is a more common 
instrument in the EU. The potential influence of the WTO on alcohol policy is 
therefore mainly indirect. Negative integration is thus a term that better describes the 
general approach of the WTO. The WTO sets rules for trade, and works for the 
elimination of trade barriers between member countries. Rather than prescribing how 
things should be done, the WTO lays down the general framework for how trade across 
borders should be conducted. The abolition of trade barriers for alcohol products has in 
principle no direct impact on how the production of alcohol products is regulated at the 
national level. It only implies that alcohol beverages can be freely sold in any member 
state. Indeed this alters opportunities and constraints for producers as well as 
consumers, but in a more indirect manner. In addition to this negative integration effect, 
the influence of the WTO and the agreements it includes can also, as argued earlier in 
this section, be seen as a form of framing integration, by providing ideas and approaches 
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to trade and economic policy that eventually are adopted by domestic actors. The 
influence of the WTO on national alcohol policy therefore can be profound. 
G A T S  
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is another important agreement 
in the WTO framework that needs to be addressed. GATS regulates trade in services. 
Like GATT, GATS might have an impact on national alcohol policy, in this case on the 
service sector involved in the alcohol policy field. According to GATS Article II (the 
most-favoured-nation clause), “…each Member shall accord immediately and 
unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less 
favourable than that it accords to like services and service suppliers of any other 
country”. As in GATT (Article XX (b)), Article XIV of the GATS authorises members 
to take measures to restrict services and service suppliers for the protection of human, 
animal or plant life or health.  
In principle, GATS includes “all” services. However, in practice member states 
commit themselves positively on a binding list. This allows WTO-members to choose 
which service sectors to open up to trade and foreign competition and which modes of 
service to liberalize. Alcohol is not included in the list of Norway or Sweden (Interview 
1). In practice therefore, services that are relevant to alcohol trade are excluded 
(Interviews 1 and 2). This illustrates the continuous importance of preserving domestic 
freedom of action in this policy area in the Nordic countries. 
Treatment of alcohol problems in the Nordic countries is overall a governmental 
public health service. GATS specificly excludes trade in public services in Article I (b): 
“…’services’ includes any service in any sector except services supplied in the exercise 
of governmental authority”. This means that this sector – in so far as it is not privatised 
– is not covered by GATS. A privatised and liberalized health service sector potentially 
represents an opening for foreign involvement and influence of new practices and ideas, 
because it then will be covered by GATS.  Although parts of the health sector in 
Norway and Sweden indeed have been privatised, trade in health services is not very 
widespread; the health sectors in Nordic countries are still mainly public (Interviews 1, 2 
and 3). Trade in health services throughout the WTO is also relatively modest, and 
commitments in health services under the GATS Agreement are generally at a low level 
(Ranson et al. 2002:28). Nevertheless, quantitative information about trade in health 
services is limited, and should be explored further. 
Alcohol monopolies are still characteristic of the Nordic alcohol policy, although 
parts of the monopoly structure have been dissolved because of EU and EEA 
involvement. GATS includes a monopolies provision (Article VIII), which ensures that 
national service monopolies does not act inconsistently with the most-favoured nation 
treatment (Article II). While the Nordic countries have exempted alcohol from their 
commitments in distribution services, other EU members have not. This could put 
particular put pressure on Sweden – as Sweden is a member of the EU. Several of the 
EU members have substantial commercial interests in alcohol trade and are major 
producers and exporters of wine. Alavaikko even describes the EU Commission as 
“…an active protagonist for more open alcohol regimes” (Alavaikko 2002:74). This 
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creates an additional challenge for EU members – like Sweden – that have a more 
restrictive outlook. 
Grieshaber-Otto and Schacter (2001) have discussed the consequences of GATS for 
public health motivated alcohol policy. They argue that, although the WTO and other 
international trade agreements have had important consequences for alcohol, with 
GATS these consequences became far more wide reaching. According to their 
interpretation, there is a fundamental discrepancy between a public health motivated 
regulation of alcohol and the GATS agreement. They claim that GATS includes many 
general features that can have an impact on national alcohol policy. For instance, it does 
not differentiate between alcohol related services that can have profound consequences 
for public health, and other services. However, they recognize that GATS includes 
certain exceptions, such as for public services. According to Grieshaber-Otto and 
Schacter, these are typically interpreted in a narrow manner and therefore might have 
profound influence on alcohol policy measures in the future. Furthermore, they argue 
that GATS “locks” political decisions, which means that political flexibility in the 
alcohol policy field will be restricted. They also mention that the agreement includes 
new measures that might influence alcohol policy, and includes provisions for further 
extensions through recurrent negotiations. The next revision of the GATS is to be 
completed in January 2005, and negotiations for the expansion of the agreement began 
early 2000. Grieshaber-Otto and Shachter argue that these elements together will lead to 
a further liberalization of the alcohol market at international level. In turn, this will mean 
that the availability of alcohol increases as well as the extension of advertising for 
alcoholic beverages (Ibid:233). Grieshaber-Otto and Schacter (Ibid.) further argue that 
GATS might have impact on the way the distribution and retail services are organised.  
The arguments of Grieshaber-Otto and his co-authors (Grieshaber-Otto and 
Jernigan 2001, Grieshaber-Otto and Schacter 2001) point to important potential 
influences on Nordic alcohol control policies. At the same time their arguments are 
mainly based on a “worst case scenario”, and include elements of speculation. Predicting 
future outcomes in social science is extremely difficult. True, a further liberalization of 
the alcohol market might lead to an increase in availability. The relationship between 
availability, prices and consumption is nevertheless not necessarily straight-forward, and 
as we have seen in the previous section, the member states of the WTO still have 
considerable freedom to interpret national regulations in the alcohol market. WTO 
member states are relatively free to impose domestic taxes as they wish, as long as there 
is no discrimination between foreign and domestic products. In this context, the 
judgements of Grieshaber-Otto and Jernigan (2001) and Grieshaber-Otto and Schacter 
(2001) – although relevant – seem somewhat exaggerated. Although greater diversity of 
products may due to decreased tariffs on foreign products tend to increase overall 
alcohol consumption, this is not always the case. Lower tariffs may simply encourage 
consumers to switch from domestic products to imports, and public health objectives 
are not threatened. This is pointed out by Gould and Shachter (2002:125). This does 
not, however, mean that advocates of public health policies and alcohol control should 
not take heed of and try to influence policy developed at international or global level. 
All the more so, the potential indirect influence of the WTO calls for a more active and 
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alert community within the field of alcohol policy. This anticipates the discussion of the 
next sections. 
T h e  W T O  a n d  P u b l i c  H e a l t h  
From a public health perspective, it is crucial to ensure that health-related issues, such as 
alcohol control, are fully taken into account in the trading system. Tension exists 
between trade interests and public health priorities. As we have seen in the previous 
sections, public health values within the WTO agreements appear mainly as exceptions. 
The WTO system recognises the need to protect health (GATT 1947 Article II), but the 
exceptions have often been read rather narrowly and appear allowable only under 
narrowly defined conditions (Ranson et al. 2002:35 and 38).  Traditionally, international 
trade and public health questions have been addressed by two different international 
organisations; the WTO covers trade while the WHO deals with international (or global) 
health matters. Over the years there have been efforts to establish a greater dialogue 
between the WTO and the WHO. The recognition of multiple links between trade and 
health policy have resulted in high-level meetings between the WTO and the WHO 
since the late 1990s (Dodgson et al. 2002) However, according to Dodgson et al., there 
still remains considerable barriers to incorporating health as a legitimate and worthy 
concern on the global trade agenda. 
The first report on the WTO and public health was published in 2002. Here, 
globalization and the links between health and trade policies are recognised. The study is 
published jointly by the WTO and the WHO, and deals with relevant WTO agreements 
and how they may influence health and health policies. The principle objective of the 
report is to describe actual and potential linkages between relevant WTO agreements 
and health. It does so by focusing on eight specific health issues: infectious disease 
control, food safety, tobacco, environment, access to drugs, health services, food 
security and nutrition, and “emerging issues” such as biotechnology. Alcohol is not 
mentioned specificly. Directors General Gro Harlem Brundtland and Mike Moore state 
that: “As the world becomes increasingly integrated, it becomes less and less possible 
for different policy areas to be handled independently of each other” (WTO/WHO 
2002:1). With this statement, reciprocal influences between trade policy and public 
health policy is recognised. Although the report is an important one as it is the first 
report dealing with issues of trade and public health, it is aimed at “readers with limited 
knowledge of health-and-trade issues” and does not examine the debate in real detail. 
The stated objective is to “…explain the issues and the various views in a factual 
manner” (Ibid:24). Despite the recognition of interconnections, the report does not give 
an in-depth analysis of these linkages and the processes influencing them. However, it 
might be a first step towards a more integrated approach to the global issues of trade 
and public health, and as such gives interesting prospects for the future. The report can 
be seen as an effort towards framing integration of the two policy fields; public health 
and trade. Herein lies a potential for including alcohol policy issues based in health 
policy priorities. 
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N a t i o n a l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  W T O  
o r g a n i s a t i o n  
National participation patterns in the WTO organisation can give clues to limits and 
prospects for influence – both from the WTO to the member countries and from the 
respective countries into the WTO organisation. These patterns also give clues to 
variations across members. Sweden and Norway both have national delegations in 
Geneva that follow the daily work of the WTO and its committees, and report to the 
responsible authorities in their respective countries. In both countries, WTO affairs are 
mainly the responsibility of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFA), but other ministries 
and authorities are involved when their policy fields are involved. The foreign ministries 
of the two countries have arrangements securing involvement of business organisations, 
workers organisations and different voluntary organisations (among them, ATTAC), 
where civil groups are encouraged to contribute with their opinions. 
In Norway, a WTO-section within the MFA (WTO-seksjonen) deals specificly with 
questions concerning the WTO. The section employs about 15 people. Most of them 
are economists, though many have a background in law or political science. In Sweden, 
the unit dealing with WTO questions is placed under the division for international trade 
affairs (Enheten för internationell handelspolitik). The division employs about 30 people, and 
7 of them work specificly with questions related to the WTO. Traditionally, Swedish 
ministries are small compared to Norwegian ministries. However, the Swedish 
government delegates to a larger extent administrative tasks to independent agencies 
sorting under different ministries. The National Board of Trade (Kommerskollegium) is 
such an independent governmental agency, which deals with foreign trade and trade 
policy. The agency employs about 85 people. Here, a unit for global trade (Enheten för 
global handel) works with WTO-related questions, in addition to several other global trade 
relations (EU, OECD, UNCTAD, non-European countries etc).6 This unit employs 
about 15 people in total. Norway does not have a similar authority with delegated 
powers. 
From Norway, the MFA and often also other involved ministries participate in the 
WTO meetings in Geneva and sit in several of the different committees in the WTO. 
Because Sweden is a member of the EU, trade and commercial policy is dealt with at 
community level. This means that Sweden for the most part participate in the WTO 
through the EU. In general, the EU Commission speaks for the EU and its member 
states in WTO meetings. When Swedish officials meet in WTO committees, they do so 
as representatives of the EU, and not as representatives of Sweden.7 The so called “133 
                                                 
6 More information on the Swedish National Board of Trade can be found at www.kommers.se  
7 Of course, in practice it can be difficult to leave one’s national affiliation behind. In principle however, Swedish 
officials have to act according to EU standpoints.  
WORKING  PAPER 5  – 2003 NO R D I C  ALCOHOL POLICY  AND GLOBALIZATION 
28 
Committee” is central here.8 Representatives of EU members meet in the 133 
Committee to discuss and negotiate standpoints on trade issues before they are taken to 
other fora – like the WTO. In practice, the EU Commission decides the agenda for the 
meetings, and may send out text suggestions in advance. Member states may act for 
certain matters to be laid before the committee or certain positions to be included in 
relevant documents, but the Commission always has the initiative. Alavaikko (2002) 
points out that, through this process, it is possible to see how policy issues “come down 
the ladder” from the EU Commission to the 133 Committee and from there on to the 
national level.  
The decisions of the 133 Committee are advisory. Although the recommendations of 
the committee for the most part are adopted, in principle the Council of Ministers 
always has the last word. The committee aims at consensus agreement, and tries not to 
run over single member states if they strongly disagree with a decision or statement 
(Interview 2). The committee meets formally once a month and consists of higher 
ranked civil servants from member states and representatives of the Commission. It can 
also organise thematic (on textiles or services for instance) or ad hoc meetings limited to 
experts. The representative of Sweden in Brussels often attends meetings and represents 
the Foreign Ministry there.  
Because Sweden cannot act on her own in relations or negotiations with the WTO, 
but has to act through the EU and the 133 Committee, her standpoints on commercial 
and trade policy issues may not always come to the fore in the WTO. On the other 
hand, acting jointly with other EU members give more weight to arguments in the 
negotiations compared to single and “small” countries – like Norway. Member states 
can raise issues of national interest on the EU agenda and may have a stronger influence 
on WTO policies through the EU than they would have alone, because EU as a single 
actor carries more weight than any individual country. 
P o s i t i v e ,  n e g a t i v e  o r  f r a m i n g  i n t e g r a t i o n ? 
The impact of the WTO can be assessed in terms of positive, negative or framing 
integration. Positive integration in the WTO – understood as direct prescription of 
institutional models – is virtually non-existent. The effect of  the WTO on national 
policy and arrangements is more indirect, and is better interpreted as forms of negative 
integration (setting the framework for liberating trade) or framing integration 
(influencing beliefs and expectations through cognitive measures).  
The GATT and GATS agreements can mainly be seen as instruments of negative 
integration. The agreements regulate terms of trade in goods and services, securing the 
principle of no discrimination across borders. The WTO as such is an institution 
working for deregulation and for the reduction of national barriers of trade. The 
                                                 
8 The name of this committee refers to Article 133 of the EU agreement. Article 133 allows the European Union to 
negotiate, conclude and implement trade agreements with other countries of the world. Paragraph 3 of the article 
states that: “If the agreements with one or more States or international organisations must be negotiated, the 
Commission presents the recommendations to the Council which authorises the opening of the necessary 
negotiations (...) The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with a special committee 
appointed by the Council to assist the Commission in this task...” 
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member states dealings with, and participation in WTO institutions, can be seen as a 
form of framing integration. As we have seen in the section above, participation 
patterns differ among various member states. Norway, for instance, deals directly with 
WTO institutions. Sweden, as an EU member, acts through the EU organisation when 
dealing with the WTO.  
By interacting in WTO committees with representatives from other member states or 
constellations of member states, ideas and policy approaches are spread and can 
influence existing domestic ideas and policies. Thus, attitudes towards alcohol policy can 
“travel” from country to country. Ideas and beliefs can thus be formed within the WTO 
framework and influence actors who participate within it. As this paper has shown, the 
potential influence of the WTO on its member states – as well as on non-members – are 
profound. However, this is not a one-way relation. By participating in the WTO, 
representatives of the Nordic countries can spread their ideas and beliefs. Sweden 
mainly interacts with the WTO through the EU, and the direct influence on the WTO is 
somewhat distorted buy this additional organisational level. However, through the EU, 
decisions and standpoints may appear more powerful compared to the arguments of 
Norway – a small country operating completely on its own. The potential influence of 
Sweden may thus be greater than the influence of Norway. At the same time, Sweden 
first has to negotiate with other EU members; a process that can make it difficult to 
promote certain national standpoints. 
The impact of globalization can be seen to depend on institutional compatibility and 
potential for adaptation combined with the force of direct or indirect external pressures 
for reform. In the case of alcohol policy in the Nordic countries, the prevalence and 
strength of the special Nordic model modifies reform pressures from outside. When 
looking at the WTO, adaptation pressure  is probably more profound through 
mechanisms of framing integration – through the influence of beliefs and expectations 
of domestic actors rather than through direct prescription of new institutional models. 
Unfortunately, framing integration is difficult to measure, and requires a lot more in-
depth analysis and interviews with central actors than has been possible in this research 
project. 
Conclusions 
Contemporary literature and recently published policy documents on alcohol policy in 
the Nordic countries reveal policy changes and international influence in a field that has 
strong traditions and a long history. The force and impact of globalization has so far not 
been examined explicitly in either of these. This paper aims to meet this theoretical and 
empirical deficit, and tries to give some answers to the potential impact of globalization 
in the Nordic alcohol policy field. 
The question of globalization and its impact on the Nordic alcohol policy is a 
complex one, and a straight forward answer is difficult to give. In the case of the Nordic 
alcohol policy field, global integration pressures meets with strong national 
arrangements and institutions, and in this changes take place. In particular, there is a 
conflict between efforts to build down regulations on alcohol trade at the international 
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level (through the WTO), and a national interest in limiting alcohol trade and 
consumption. However, national institutions and traditions – as we have seen in the 
Nordic alcohol policy field – can to some extent resist and modify externally initialised 
reforms.  At the same time, Nordic countries are highly globalized countries, and as 
such they are more compatible to further globalization pressures compared to countries 
that are not as globalized.  
Negative integration, positive integration and framing integration have been useful 
terms in the analysis of the changing Nordic alcohol policies and the impact of 
globalization. Negative integration captures indirect changes, typically restricted to the 
abolition of domestic arrangements which distort free trade. This is the main instrument 
of the WTO. A direct influence on national administration is more evident in efforts of 
positive integration, where institutional models and regulative measures are positively 
prescribed. This is a more common instrument used by the European Union, for 
instance in food policy where detailed regulations prescribe the composition of different 
products and how hygiene and safety measures are to be enforced. In the WTO such 
measures are not prominent. 
Framing integration describes an even more indirect form of influence. Here, the 
norms and cognition of actors are influenced.  These are activities that can be aimed to 
prepare the ground for subsequent policies of positive or negative integration. Rather 
than prescribing concrete outcomes or altering institutional opportunity structures, 
these policies are designed to change the domestic political climate by stimulating and 
strengthening the overall support for broader reform objectives. The mechanism of 
framing integration is implemented when only vague and symbolic policies can be 
adapted, given underlying conflicts of interest, or – as in the case of Nordic alcohol 
policies – when traditional national policies are at a clash with other (global) ideas. 
Framing integration alters expectations and beliefs of domestic actors, and in doing so, 
trigger domestic institutional change. Framing integration can be important in the WTO 
in addition to instruments of negative integration. Through participation in the different 
fora of the WTO, ideas and beliefs on trade a nd trade policies can be altered and further 
influence domestic attitudes. Indirectly, this can influence beliefs and attitudes relevant 
to alcohol policy. 
Framing integration is not so much a characteristic of the WTO as it is of 
globalization in general. Tighter relations across countries spurs flow of ideas and 
beliefs, and spread attitudes and consumption patterns. However, it is important to note 
that these “flows” of ideas, behaviour patterns and beliefs are not one-way only. Nordic 
countries are not only influenced by the outside world, they themselves can influence 
others. Some of the empirical evidence on consumption patterns in Europe point in this 
direction. 
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